

# Navigating Through The Historical Trajectory Of The Theories Of Collective Behaviour And Collective Action: A Sociological Overview

Dr Arya Priya

Assistant Professor

Post Graduate Department Of Sociology

Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar Bihar University

Muzaffarpur, Bihar (India) – 842001.

---

## Abstract:

The sociological theories of collective behaviour and collective action have gone through several phases, the historical imperatives of each phase necessitating the changes and improvements over the earlier propounded theories. This makes the study of the evolution of the theories of collective behaviour and action highly fascinating. Only by situating the theories in their historical contexts, one can grasp an accurate perspective of the theories propounded at several historical junctures, which the sociologists generally call moments of 'turns' in the sociological theories. This paper is an attempt to map out a synoptic yet coherent picture of the progression in the history of the theories of collective action and behaviour. However, the paper is not just limited to reinventing the wheel. The author tries to come up with his own observations and conclusions, with a view to stimulating an informed debate on such a burning and topical subject.

**Keywords:** mass society, framing, resource mobilisation, contentious politics, legitimation crisis.

---

Date of Submission: 14-05-2024

Date of Acceptance: 24-05-2024

---

## I. Introduction:

The theories of collective behaviour and collective action in sociology have a chequered history. Till late 1960s and early 1970s, sociologists studied events like crowds, panics, fads, protests, or social movements under the common rubric of Collective Behaviour, and visualised them mostly as irrational outbursts emanating from strains in social values and norms. These events were seen as spasmodic acts of collective eruption, or what Crossley (2002) calls "collective hysteria". By early 1970s, this approach underwent a sea-change, as protests or movements were no longer seen as irrational rage or flare-up, rather as rational, calculated, and calibrated activities to either bring about or resist social changes. The theories of collective behaviour gave way to new emerging theories under the rubric of Collective Action. With changes in the repertoire of actions, leadership, or the mass base of mobilisation, the theories of collective action too have undergone numerous alterations, to keep up with the changing dimensions of the protest-movements. The fast global sweep of new social movements and the expeditious spread of internet in recent times, have imparted a completely new direction to the study of collective action.

The primary emphasis of this paper is how the theories of collective behaviour and collective action<sup>1</sup> have evolved over time, with focus on social movements. With an attempt to imparting full justice to the topic, the paper avoids going too much into the details of the various theories (presents only synoptic views of a few of them), rather stick to their historical trajectory, and the factors responsible for the changes. Before I delve into it, let me take a phrase from Giddens (1971) just to keep our interest piqued – and that phraseology is "epistemological break". A major epistemological break in the understanding of collective behaviour and collective action took place in late 1960s or early 1970s, and the paper will come back to it later.

## Navigating through the historical turns in the theories of collective behaviour and collective action:

Any study of theories seems incomplete without a reference to the classics of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Let me touch upon them in brief.

Buechler (2011) posits that though Marx does not talk of social movements as such, but he does adumbrate collective action in the form of revolution, while proposing his thesis on the transformation of capitalism to communism. To Marx, the revolution of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie would take place when the appropriation of the surplus values reaches acute level and the exploitation of the working class

unbearable, petty bourgeoisie too undergoes pauperisation and proleterianisation, the false consciousness of the working class falls apart, and the class-in-itself gets transformed into class-for-itself. The revolution would first lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and finally to communism.

Though Marx's macro-historical trajectory from capitalism to communism has more or less been discarded, even by later Marxists, but several of his ideas and concepts are still very much relevant, and being extensively used in making sense of collective action and behaviour. The paper will touch upon Marx again as it moves on.

For the moment, I hold Durkheim back, for the subsequent section on collective behaviour. Let us touch upon Weber briefly.

Buechler (2011) says that just like Marx, Weber is hardly seen as a theorist of social movement, but several of his core ideas are rich with implications for the study of collective action. Some of those ideas relevant to the study of social movements, are his exposition on charismatic leadership, and how it can bring about social changes, or his stress on causality to be rooted in interpretative understanding which has served as the wellspring of the phenomenological understanding of how actors in a collective action, through their lived experiences, give meaning to their social situations, congealing together to bring about changes. Further, as against Marx's reductionist materialist approach, Weber stresses on ideation as a driving force for social change, which has inspired theorists of movements like Tilly (1978), who calls to attention the role of beliefs, values and ideas, in propelling group cohesion and collective action. And not to forget Weber's notion of ideal types, which has enabled the theorists of collective action, to navigate through the complexities of movements, and build a coherent theoretical frame of reference, which can be used to gauge actual action on the ground.

Having touched upon the classical theorists, let us turn now to some of the major theories of collective behaviour and action, and the historical trajectory they have undertaken.

For the sake of simplicity, I divide the major turns in theoretical expositions into three historical phases:

- a) Until late 1960s, the dominant rubric for understanding mass upsurge or mobilisation was the Collective Behaviour Approach.
- b) Since late 1960s and early 1970s, collective behaviour approach gave way to the Collective Action Approach. A critical shift during this phase was the relegation into the backseat, the Marxist approach to the study of movements, and the rise of a new paradigm of New Social Movement, and equally important was the cultural turn in the theorisation of movements.
- c) The widespread use of internet and information technology since the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, which has brought new conceptions of mobilisation, leadership, and a strong democratisation of the movements themselves.

Up until late 1960s, the dominant understanding of movements or upsurges was through the perspective of Collective Behaviour. This approach studied an array of collective phenomena such as craze, fads, fashions, emotional outbursts, crowds, panics, and even protests and social movements. This approach studied these shared actions, not as some rational activities, but as irrational responses to some stimuli (Crossley, 2002).

Before I bring to light the factors which were responsible for the collective behaviour approach to lose its sheen by late 1960s and early 1970s, let me discuss in short some of the major theories of collective behaviour. I highlight here briefly four theories.

A major theory in this regard is the Contagion Theory, primarily attributed to Le Bon (1895). Contagion theory focuses on the social-psychological aspects of collective behaviour. It attempts to explain how moods, attitudes and behaviour are communicated rapidly, and soon accepted by others. Le Bon (1895) argues that people are more likely to engage in anti-social and irrational behaviour in a crowd, because they are anonymous and so feel in-vulnerable. In course of time, the crowd that develops takes a life of its own larger than the beliefs and actions of any one person. Because of its anonymity, the crowd transforms rational beings into an irrational single organism with a collective mind of its own.

Arguing from a symbolic-interactionist perspective, Blumer (1951) explains how movements develop by beginning with the gradual coalescence of crowds, first through social unrest and agitation arising out of structural or normative strains or even relative deprivation, and which form the basis of shared awareness. This agitation generally displays the collective behaviour in terms of milling, or collective excitement or collective effervescence. Next, a "we consciousness" develops to give a definition to the coalescing groups. In Blumer's (1951) words, an "esprit de corps" develops to give group solidarity, and a sense of belonging that becomes part of the members' self-identity. Next group morals develop, and an organisation builds, clearly defining the group's demands and tactics.

Another significant theory is the mass society theory put forth by Kornhauser (1959). Kornhauser argues that people seek out social movements, as a way to gain access to belonging and importance. Social

movements are more likely to arise in impersonal mass societies. People with weak social ties are most eager to join the movements. People who are well integrated with their societies or in communities, by contrast, are less likely to see the membership of the social ties. Kornhauser concludes that people who tend to join the movements tend to be psychologically vulnerable, and hence susceptible to manipulation by the leaders (Kornhauser, 1959; Macionis, 2018: 727-728).

Arguably, the most important theory in the collective behaviour approach, is the Structural –Strain theory developed by Smelser (1962). Arguing from the structural functional perspective, Smelser says that collective behaviour or social movements emerge when the society witnesses structural strain or a breakdown of existing norms. The theory of Smelser includes phenomena as diverse as panics, crazes, protests, outbursts, and social movements under one umbrella, the assumptions being that the same factors are at play in all these collective forms. Smelser’s theory specifies six necessary and sufficient determinants: structural conduciveness when people come to think that their society has some serious problem, the structural strain whereby due to the existing problems, the society fails to meet the expectations of the people leading to strain, the spread of generalised beliefs among the people, a precipitating event which sets off the collective behaviour, mobilisation for action, and an overarching counterforce of social control which constrains the development of action.

While discussing the classical theorists, I had mentioned that I would bring Durkheim in a later section. And here, in the theories of collective behaviour, Durkheim’s (1897/1951) notion of “anomie” is writ large. Put simply, anomie refers to the social condition which is characterized by the breakdown of the norms governing social interaction (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2006: 17). Whether it is the structural strain theory of Smelser, or the interactionist theory of Blumer, Durkheim’s conception of anomie and the consequent breakdown of norms and values and the weakening of the community feelings, are the foundations on which the theories of collective behaviour are built.

By late 1960s and early 1970s, the theorists of social movements, had started losing their interest in the collective behaviour approach.

Goodwin and Jasper (2015: 3-7), quite tellingly, brings out the reason for this. By late 1960s, those who had studied social movements, saw in the collective behaviour approach, the actors involved as dangerous mobs or cowards who acted irrationally, as slaves to their emotions, blindly following the demagogues, who manipulated their vulnerabilities in the endemic “mass society” (Kornhauser, 1959), a society marked by loose and fragile social and interpersonal ties, rising individualism, and breakdown of community feelings. The scholars of social movements had little sympathy for these crowds, as they were thought to whip up emotions that “made people do things they would not otherwise do, wanted not to do, and should not do” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2015: 5).

Crossley (2002:11) brings forth further critical points as to why the collective behaviour approach witnessed a backsliding by late 1960s. One of the starkest demerits of collective behaviour approach was that it saw the emergence of movements, protests or crowds, simply as irrational social-psychological responses to grievances, anomie or deprivations. They were just manifestations of mob psychology or collective hysteria.

Another big demerit of collective behaviour approach, according to Crossley (2002) was that it clubbed social movements and protests with other forms like fads, crazes, panic, etc. Social movement by 1960s was emerging as a distinct field of study and was seen not only as an outcome of only structural or normative strains, but rooted in the very political institutions and structures of the society, which were invariably the space of contested and conflicting ideologies and visions. The conspicuous absence of political actors and institutions from collective behaviour approach was nothing but baffling.

By late 1960s, social movements were no longer seen as misguided, immature, and irrational behaviour. It was very much viewed as a rational mobilisation of actors to achieve a particular social goal. Some of the definitions of social movements clearly bring forth this attribute of theirs. For instance, Goodwin and Jasper (2015: 3) defines a movement as a conscious, concerted, and sustained effort by people to change some aspects of their society using extra-institutional means. Della Porta and Daini (2006) conceptualise social movement as a distinct social process consisting of actors involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents, and they are linked by dense informal networks, and share a distinct collective identity. Almost all definitions of social movements have one thing in common – they are visualised as rational purposive actions.

As such, by late 1960s, and early 1970s, the approach of collective behaviour, because of its limitations, gave way to the new approach of Collective Action.

In the beginning, I had said that someplace down the road, I will bring into discussion Giddens’ (1971) phraseology of “epistemological break” to identify the factors which were responsible for the fundamental shift in the paradigm of the study of social movements by 1970s, as new theories started emerging under the rubric of collective action.

By 1960s, a changed ontology i.e. an existing outside social reality could be perceived, and so a new epistemology i.e. the theory of knowledge was needed to make sense of the emerging ontology. And it was this need for a new epistemology which brought about a “break” from the earlier approach of collective behaviour. I

highlight here some of the major emerging sociological realities in 1960s in the US and Europe, which were also deeply instrumental in the rise of the New Social Movements.

First, the material basis of studying society was fast giving way to the conceptualisation of a post-material society, marked by emphasis on quality of life, human rights and identity politics. It formed the basis of the new social movements, and other theories of collective action (Buechler, 1995; Pichardo, 1997).

Second, the orthodox Marxist framework of conflict between workers and capitalists were no longer the dominant theme of studying movements or upheavals in societies, even among the later Marxists such as the Frankfurt school. Bottomore (2002) points out that the prominent Frankfurt school theorist Marcuse (1964) held that the revolutionary ideas of Marx to effect social change were no longer applicable in modern capitalism. But Marcuse (1964) placed huge faith in social movements, especially the new social movements, such as the antiwar movements in the US, or the students' protest movements in Europe, global justice movement, environmentalism, feminism, etc. in bringing about social change, even though incrementally. Habermas (1981) too reposed his faith in the emerging new movements.

Third, workers, as considered in orthodox Marxism, by 1960s were no longer at the centre of the social movements. In the emerging post materialist or post Marxist society, it was the educated class, the university students, and the neo-middle class which had started occupying the center-stage of movements. Also, there occurred a big change in leadership, which I will discuss shortly.

Fourth, the late 1960s also witnessed a major cultural turn in the study of social movements, in which the idea of framing became very important. I will talk about framing too briefly (Edwards, 2014).

And fifth, a major shift in the study of movements was also brought about by the attempts of the actors in the movement to put pressure on not only the political entities and actors to bring about the change, but also in the cultural sphere, where movements attempted to effect changes in the attributes and the behaviour of the participants themselves. The most glaring example of it was the environmental movement, where the participants, in addition to putting pressure on political actors to enact environmentally friendly legislation, also stressed upon changes in individual's day-to-day activities to preserve the environment (Pichardo, 1997).

All the factors discussed above, leading to societal shifts since late 1960s, coupled with the shortcomings of the collective behaviour approach, needed a new paradigm of studying social movements. And so emerged on the scene, the collective action perspective. I discuss, in short, some of the most prominent paradigms within the collective action approach.

What is generally considered the first cogent attempt towards building a theoretical frame by considering actors as rational beings in the study of collective action, came from an economist, Mancur Olson (1965). Olson (1965) regards humans as rational beings, and they participate in movements only after weighing the balance between the costs and the benefits. Only when the costs of non-participation exceed the benefits of sitting idle, freeloading on the efforts of others, does a person participate in the movement. This concept is extremely important, because the organisers or the leaders of the movement, need to ensure that a large section of the people participate in the various repertoire of actions of the movement, so that the critical mass<sup>2</sup> of participation is achieved. Achieving a critical mass is crucial for any movement for its impact to be felt.

Close on the heels of Olson, McCarthy and Zald (1977), developed a highly influence theory of collective action, taking formal organisations as the core of social movements, and showing that these social movement organisations, called the SMOs, act a lot like business firms – they try to accumulate resources, hire staff, and “sell” their points of view to potential contributors. SMOs even compete against one another for contributions, and together they add up to constitute the “social movement industry”. The theory of McCarthy and Zald (1977) is popularly known as the “resource mobilization theory”. Just as Olson sees individuals as rational, McCarthy and Zald view organisations as rational. They refuse to dismiss protests or movements as silly or dangerous. To them, there often exist enough discontented people in a society to engage in a collective action, but the key factors which explain the emergence or sustenance of a movement, are how the leaders or the organisers are able to “mobilise” resources – the theory thus focuses on how the leaders are able to raise funds, and build the necessary infrastructure to sustain the movement.

A critical paradigm of collective action which has hogged much limelight of late is the “political process theory”, popularised by scholars such as McAdam (1982) and Tilly and Tarrow (2006). Proponents of this theory perceive movements as primarily political, making demands on the states or elites, and asking for changes in laws and policies. In the political process theory, the social movement is seen as rational, in fact, normal politics using extra institutional means. Protesters are seen as rational people, pursuing their interests as best as they can. By highlighting social movements' interaction with the state, the political process theory not only focuses on the conflict with the state, but also how the state itself can provide enabling “opportunities” for the emergence and sustenance of the movement. For instance, it is far easier to have movements in democratic societies, than in autocracies where movements could soon fizzle out as a consequence of the repression of the state or the ruling elites.

Probably, the most talked about and debated version under the collective action approach is the theory of New Social Movements, developed by several scholars such as Touraine (1981), Melucci (1980) and Habermas (1981). These movements are linked to broad historical developments, and as discussed earlier, especially relate to the shift from the industrial or the manufacturing society, to the post-industrial or the post-material society, where more than the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the focus is on identity-affirmation, quality of life or human rights. The new social movements are mainly led by the educated middle class, and focus on issues like environmentalism, global justice, rights of the women or the LGBTQ community, etc. (Pichardo, 1997).

The paper briefly touches upon two of the prominent theories of new social movements.

Touraine (1981) argues that with the decline of meta-social guarantees of social order, society is turning now more as a product of reflective social action. The rising capacity of social actors to construct both a system of knowledge and the technical tools needed to tweak them – a capacity Touraine calls “historicity” – makes possible the self-production of contemporary society. Buechler (1995) says that the control of historicity is the object of ongoing struggle between classes, as manifested through the new social movements, defined by relations of domination. In post-industrial society, the major social classes consist of the consumers/clients in the role of the popular class, and the technocrats/managers in the role of the dominant class. The primary field of conflict between the two classes is culture, and the conflict involves who will control the society’s capacity for self-management.

Arguably the most talked about theory of new social movement is that of Habermas (1981). And Habermas discusses his theory within his overarching sociological framework of Legitimation Crisis (Habermas, 1975), premised on his conception of the “colonization of the life-world”. Let me explain this only to the extent relevant to our discussion on new social movements, and also take the liberty of using other sociologists to drive home the ideas of Habermas. According to Habermas, every society has two major components – the “system” where the media of money and power determine the best way to achieve instrumental goals, and the “life-world” where the normative elements dominate in governing everyday life (Beuchler, 1995). Legitimation crisis occurs when “system” tries to overcome the “life-world”. This is quite common in modern capitalism, where with the emergence of the mass-society (Kornhauser, 1959; Bottomore, 2002), communal bonds are loosened, and the working class are stupefied against any class consciousness. There is a breakdown of norms, a consequence of Durkheim’s anomie, and as a consequence of the erosion of values and norms guiding everyday life i.e. the corrosion of the life-world, it is the money and power media of the system which colonises the life-world, in the sense that our values and norms are now also guided by instrumental goals. This leads to a deep sense of vacuum and flux in the present late modern society (Giddens, 1991), or what Bauman (2000) calls “liquid modernity”, which according to Bauman is characterised by “uncertainty” and “ambivalence”, or what Giddens (1991) calls “disembeddedness”. However, as I had mentioned earlier, Frankfurt school theorists like Marcuse and Habermas hold that even in such situations, social movements can take place where people can identify their problems, and the structural strains in the society. For Habermas, it is this legitimation crisis in modern capitalism marked by the colonisation of the life-world, which is primarily responsible for the emergence of the new social movements.

As I have mentioned earlier, a critical shift in the theorisation of collective action in 1970s was brought about by the cultural turn. We have already seen this while discussing the new social movement theories of Touraine (1981) and Habermas (1981), where the contestations are mainly within the cultural sphere. Here, I take it further to highlight the concept of “framing” – i.e. how the movement and its various aspects such as the definition of the social situation, movement objectives, ideology, and the repertoire of actions are being framed and put forth before the movement participants (Edwards, 2014). Framing by the leadership is critical to draw as many participants in the movement as possible, by making the movement and its tactics appealing to the actors, so that Olson’s dilemma is taken care of, and a critical mass in the movement is achieved. Snow and Benford (1992) defines frame as an interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the world out there by selectively encoding the objectives, events, situation, and experiences. If we look at the definition of frame closely, and also recollect, this takes us back to our discussion on Weber earlier, that the study of collective action does involve interpretative sociology, and a phenomenological understanding of the lived experiences of the people. Further, frames, to be appealing, are invariably rooted in the cultural values and norms of the society.

Another significant component in cultural turn is the stress on “emotions” as a crucial element in collective action, as highlighted by Goodwin and Jasper (2001). Emotions play an important role in social movements. Organisers must arouse a variety of complex emotions, such as anger or outrage or compassion, often by playing on fears or anxieties. At times, these fears and anxieties also need to be mitigated and tempered, and properly channelised during the movement. Organisers must also offer some joys and excitement to participants, in order to motivate them to stay in the movement.

On several occasions earlier, while discussing the collective action theories, the role and significance of leadership had come up. Leadership is very important, because ultimately it is the leaders who guide the participants, and channelise their energies in a way so as to achieve the objectives of the movement. I don't think, there is any point here belaboring the importance of charismatic leadership. History is replete with instances of how charismatic leaders have mobilised and moved the masses to attain the goals of collective action.

However, I need to point out one thing here. Since 1970s, a perceptible change not only in the social composition of the participants, but also of the leaders has been witnessed, especially in the new social movements. And here, let me bring into our discussion, Mannheim's (1929) idea of "free-floating intellectuals", who now mostly constitute the leadership of the movements. Unlike the Marxist notion of leadership, the free-floating intelligentsia is a privileged social unit, unattached to any social group, and is intellectually autonomous. These intellectuals occupy a social location outside the main institutions of the capitalist society. To Mannheim (1929), these relatively classless, highly undifferentiated intelligentsia are unified by bonds of education, and they can act as a strong torchbearers of change. Because of their relative detachment to specific social location and material interests, they are highly alive and sensitive to the existing socio-political currents. As unattached intellectuals, they can play a crucial role in synthesising the perspectives of different groups into a "totality", which can be immensely useful in leading a social movement, winning the trust of its participants, and in bringing about the requisite social change.

A significant factor, of late, impacting the study of collective action, is the rapid spread of internet and the rise of several social media platforms. Castells (2012) says that these social media platforms such as facebook, twitter and others, has added a new dimension to collective action, especially the way mobilisation takes place. People having common grievances can be mobilised in no time, using social media and internet, which was unheard of earlier. Also, the message of the leadership can pass onto the participants in no time. Social media has also led to the deepening of the process of democratisation in social movements, where movements can no longer be visualised just as top-down, but also as moving bottom-up, where the voices and ideas of individual participants are also heard. Drawing extensively upon his study of Arab Spring of 2011 which were both actuated by and mediated through social media, Castells (2012) posits that internet has brought about a new era in the study of collective action, which he terms the "networked social movements".

According to Della Porta and Diani (2006), another change in the dimension of collective action brought out by the spread of internet, is the issue of the "longevity" of the social movements. Earlier, social movements, unlike protests or campaigns, were considered to exist for a sustained period of time. Now with the advent of social media, leading to the mobilisation of masses at breakneck speed, the issue of the longevity of the social movements is now hotly debated. A collective action can now last for a short period, and its significance is to be gauged by what Gamson (1990) says what impact it has left on the society, and if it has effected some lasting changes in the society, whether in the cultural or the structural sphere.

## **II. Conclusion:**

In conclusion, it is pertinent to say that even though by late 1960s, collective behaviour approach gave way to the collective action approach, according to Crossley (2002), if we are to capture the full import and dimensions of social movements, the conceptual frameworks of collective behaviour approach cannot be fully jettisoned. The notions of structural strains, relative deprivation, social unrest, anomie and others are still very useful, even while using the collective action approach. Crossley (2002) says that terms like collective, protest, and movement, derive their meanings from specific contexts. Their definitions obey what Bourdieu (Swartz, 1997) would call the "fuzzy logic" of social practice. And a prudent combination of the concepts developed in both the collective behaviour and collective action approaches, is the best way to make a well-rounded sense of the social movements.

### **Notes**

1. It is quite interesting and also intriguing to find that hardly any literature (I have come across) on collective behaviour and action explains in detail, how these terms actually came into being in the first place. However, as we see the various aspects of collective behaviour and collective action in the subsequent sections of the paper, a compelling and educated guess can be made that the driving force behind these terminologies is Weber's (1922/1964) notion of "social action", and his distinction between behaviour and action. Turner (1983) points out that Weber makes a clear differentiation between action and purely reactive behaviour. To Weber, behaviour, as a process, involves little agency in terms of thought process. A stimulus is presented and behaviour occurs, with little intervening between the stimulus and the behaviour. Action, on the other hand, involves meticulous thought process, between the stimulus and the ultimate response. Action is, therefore, meaningful, and it is the task of the sociologists to make an interpretative understanding of the social action.

2. To Marwell and Oliver (1993), critical mass is central to the understanding of collective action. Only when a movement crosses a threshold of resource in terms of public participation does it get serious attention from those in power, media, and also from outside observers, who then take earnest interest in the goals and objectives of the movement.

**Declaration of conflicting interests:**

The author declares no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article.

**Funding:**

The author has received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

**References:**

- [1] Abercrombie, N., S. Hill And B.S. Turner. (2006). *The Penguin Dictionary Of Sociology*. London: Penguin Books.
- [2] Bauman, Z. (2000). *Liquid Modernity*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- [3] Blumer, H. (1951). *Collective Behaviour*. In Mcclung-Lee (Ed). *Principles Of Sociology*. New York: Barnes And Noble; Pp. 167-222.
- [4] Bottomore, Tom. (2002). *The Frankfurt School And Its Critics*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- [5] Buechler, S. (1995). *New Social Movement Theories*. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 36:3, Pp. 441-464.
- [6] Buechler, S. (2011). *Understanding Social Movements*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- [7] Castells, M. (2012). *Networks Of Outrage And Hope*. Malden, Ma: Polity Press.
- [8] Crossley, N. (2002). *Making Sense Of Social Movements*. Berkshire: Open University Press.
- [9] Della Porta, D And M. Diani. (2006). *Social Movements. An Introduction (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.)*. Malden, Ma: Wiley Blackwell.
- [10] Durkheim, E. (1897/1951). *Suicide. A Study In Sociology*. Glencoe: Free Press (Originally Published In French In 1897).
- [11] Edwards, G. (2014). *Social Movements And Protests*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- [12] Gamson, W. (1990). *The Strategy Of Social Protest*. Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth.
- [13] Gerth, H.H. And C.W. Mills. (1948). *From Max Weber: Essays In Sociology*. Abingdon: Routledge And Kegan Paul.
- [14] Giddens, A. (1971). *Capitalism And Modern Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [15] Giddens, A. (1991). *The Consequences Of Modernity*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- [16] Goodwin, J. And J. M. Jasper. (2001). (Eds.). *Passionate Politics: Emotions And Social Movements*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- [17] Goodwin, J. And J.M. Jasper (2015). *The Social Movement Reader: Cases And Concepts (3<sup>rd</sup> Ed.)*. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
- [18] Habermas, J. (1975). *Legitimation Crisis*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- [19] Habermas, J. (1981). *New Social Movements*. *Telos*, 49: 33-37.
- [20] Kornhauser, W. (1959). *The Politics Of Mass Society*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- [21] Le Bon, G. (1895). *The Crowd. A Study Of The Popular Mind*. New York: Viking Press.
- [22] Macionis, J. (2018). *Sociology. (17<sup>th</sup> Ed)*. New Delhi: Pearson.
- [23] Mannheim, K. (1929). *Ideology And Utopia*. Abingdon: Routledge And Kegan Paul.
- [24] Marcuse, H. (1964). *One Dimensional Man*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- [25] Marwell, G. And P. Oliver. (1993). *The Critical Mass In Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [26] Melucci, A. (1980). *The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach: Social Science Information*, 19: 199-226.
- [27] Mcadam, D. (1982). *Political Protests And The Development Of Black Insurgency*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- [28] Mccarthy, J.D. And M.N. Zald. (1977). *Resource Mobilization And Social Movements: A Partial Theory*. *American Journal Of Sociology*, 82: 1212-1241.
- [29] Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic Of Collective Action*. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.
- [30] Pichardo, N.A. (1997). *New Social Movements. A Critical Review*. *Annual Review Of Sociology*, Vol 23, Pp. 411-30.
- [31] Smelser, N.J. (1962). *Theory Of Collective Behaviour*: Abingdon: Routledge.
- [32] Snow, D.A. And R.D. Benford. (1992). *Protest Frames And Cycles Of Protest*. In A.D. Moms And C. Mcclung Mueller (Eds.). *Frontiers In Social Movement Theory*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- [33] Swartz, D. (1997). *The Sociology Of Pierre Bourdieu*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- [34] Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization To Revolution*. Boston: Addison-Wesley.
- [35] Tilly, C. And S. Tarrow. (2006). *Contentious Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [36] Touraine, A. (1981). *The Voice And The Eye: An Analysis Of Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- [37] Turner, S.P. (1983). *Weber On Action*. *American Sociological Review*, 48: 506 -19.
- [38] Weber, Max. (1922/1964). *Basic Concepts In Sociology*. New York: Citadel Press (Originally Published In German In 1922).